The Report of the R.101 Inquiry is unusual among accident reports in printing its evidence. The Air Ministry put every file it had before the Court, and Sir John Simon quoted the ones that mattered at length, so that a reader could judge them. This piece sets the chief of them out in the order in which they were written. The words are the documents’ own, as the report gives them; the sentences between are only to say who wrote to whom.

11 and 12 November 1929: the chief coxswain’s report

R101 rode out a gale at the Cardington tower on 11 November 1929, with gusts of eighty-three miles an hour. Chief Coxswain G. W. Hunt reported to the first officer:

“During Storm Routine of the above dates whilst looking round it was observed that in the case of Nos. 3 to 14 bags inclusive, a very considerable movement from side to side was taking place on each flat end, as much as 3” to 4”, and at times the surge of the bags in a forward and after direction was considerably more.

“Owing to the combined two movements, where the bags were touching or nearly touching the radial struts round main frames, especially at C and D longitudinals, the plates on top of the radial struts rubbed and chafed the bags, and in places such as No. 8 starboard fore end tore the bag 9” in a jagged tear. No. 8 thus became deflated to 60% and on inspection taking place it was noticed that on every roll the valves opened to the extent of ¼” to ½”. The valves were lightly stopped back until the bag was gassed to 95%.

“The holes on top of No. 14 bag were caused by the bag bearing hard on O girder, where several nuts project and combined with the movements of the bag caused punctures.”

28 November 1929: the minister chooses delay

Sir John Higgins, Air Member for Supply and Research, had put the alternatives to Lord Thomson on 21 November: minor alterations and a flight to India in the spring, or an extra bay and a flight in the autumn. Thomson replied:

“A.M.S.R.

“I am of opinion that no good, and quite possibly some harm, might be done by a flight to India in the early months of 1930. The best course would I think be:—

“(a) To make the various alterations you suggest in para. 3 of your minute.

“(b) To insert the extra bay.

“(c) To make every effort for a flight with 55 tons disposable load to India and back at the end of Sept., 1930.

“28.11.1929. T.”

6 December 1929: the standard for the certificate

Higgins, in a minute to the Secretary of State setting out the good results of the trials so far, added:

“Before she gets a full Certificate of Airworthiness, R.101 has yet to do a 48 hours’ endurance flight. There has hitherto been no suitable opportunity for this, as we cannot run the risk of an endurance flight finishing in a gale.”

1 July 1930: the captain’s report on the Hendon flights

Flight Lieutenant Irwin to Major Scott, after the three flights of 26, 27 and 28 June:

“It was noticed during flight that the Outer Cover, E to F panel just for’d of Frame 13, was flapping considerably more than on previous trials. It should be worth while inflating this panel.

“The cover was also flapping all along between C and D and it is considered possible that gas valves may have been affected, as even allowing for the numerous holes which are now being found in gasbags where they have rubbed on protruding nuts of Main Longitudinals, the loss of gas would not have accounted for the heaviness of the ship during flight on Friday and Saturday.

“A report on gasbags will be rendered later on. The non-padding of girders before inflation and flying has resulted in an abundance of holes in gasbags.

“H. Carmichael Irwin, Capt. R.101.”

2 July 1930: the designer’s minute

Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond to Major Scott, in an “unregistered Minute” found during the inquiry:

“In connection with the reported loss of lift of R.101 during flight I have been investigating the effect of holes in the gasbags. I find that, if it be assumed that the average height of the holes is equal to three quarters of the height of the ship, then, the rate of loss of lift is about 1 ton per square inch of opening in 12 hours. This calculation assumes quite a pessimistic coefficient of discharge such as would be applicable to a triangular hole. In my opinion, this result is somewhat startling and emphasises the great importance of guarding against holes in these present ships. Even if the holes are in the form of slits which have comparatively little effective area of discharge, it seems to me quite conceivable that we may have had leaks in both ships amounting to 4 or 5 square inches of area.

The same day Thomson minuted the Air Ministry: “I should like to be able to count definitely on starting for India during the week-end September 26-28th. I ought to be back by October 16th.”

3 July 1930: the inspector’s letter

F. McWade, Inspector in Charge of the Aeronautical Inspection Directorate at the Royal Airship Works, to the Secretary of the Air Ministry, Adastral House, Kingsway, “for the attention of D.A.I. (A.I.D.)”, marked Confidential, under the heading “H.M.A. R.101. Airworthiness of the above ‘ship”:

“On the 26.6.30 I handed over the ‘Permit to Fly’ dated 20.6.30—valid until 19.7.30 to D.A.D.

“Owing to the modifications which have recently been carried out on the Wiring System, the gasbags are now hard up against the main longitudinals and rubbing very hard on the nuts of the bolts positioning the stirrup into which the tie rods are screwed. Further, the gasbags foul very badly the heads of the taper pins at the joints of the main and intermediate struts at the inner ridge girder ends. This matter, in my opinion, has become very serious, as the points of fouling occur throughout the ship and amount to thousands.

“Padding has been resorted to by wrapping fabric over the parts mentioned above and this is the usual recognised method used in isolated cases. Padding to the extent now necessary is, in my opinion, very unsatisfactory, because the bags move when the ‘ship is in flight and the padding becomes loose and the projection complained of is again exposed.

“Although the gasbags have recently been reconditioned and were in good order when placed in the ship a few weeks ago, there are now many holes in them.

“The next point is that where the fabric is wrapped round a joint it may be difficult to know what is happening underneath the wrapping (I have in mind the corrosion question). The fabric will become damp and in many cases wet when the ship is in flight; therefore, there will be alternate process of wetting and drying of the fabric which must be detrimental to the metal underneath.

“I am fully aware that to remedy the faults complained of is in the nature of a large undertaking and it may be necessary to remove the bags from the ship. Until this matter is seriously taken in hand and remedied I cannot recommend to you the extension of the present ‘Permit to Fly’ or the issue of any further permit or certificate.

“F. McWade, 3.7.30. Inspector in Charge, A.I.D. at R.A.W. Cardington, Bedford.”

8 July 1930: the director’s reply

Colonel Outram, Director of Aeronautical Inspection, received the letter on 4 July and asked Wing Commander Colmore for his comments before putting it to Higgins. Colmore replied:

“D.A.I.

“I feel sure you will agree that we cannot accept, as a matter of principle, that the gasbags in an airship should be clear of all girders. Also I expect you will agree that we can accept padding as being a satisfactory method of preventing holes forming in gasbags from this cause.

“As far as we can trace at present there have been remarkably few nips in the gasbags of R.101 and that the holes which have occurred are due to the bags fouling girders. We have little doubt that padding will be a permanent remedy and, if this is accepted, then it is certainly not a large undertaking to put the matter right. In fact, we hope to complete the necessary padding in R.101 by the end of the present week or, at any rate, some time next week.

“We do not think any objection can be taken to wrapping padding round obstructions of this nature.

“The above covers our views but I should be very glad to discuss the matter with you when you are next at Cardington.

“R.A.W. R. B. B. Colmore, 8.7.30. D.A.D.”

11 July 1930: the matter closed

Outram, having decided not to send the letter to Higgins, minuted McWade:

“Of course I fully realise the necessity of avoiding the contact of these damaging points to the gasbags. I have taken the matter up with D.A.D. who is in agreement, but as you yourself realise, it is impossible to alter the hull structure of the ship at this stage. The only expedient at the moment is to pad, and it is your duty to see that every point which may lead to damage is padded in a proper manner.”

14 July 1930: the minister insists

Higgins to Thomson, proposing to hold up the cutting-open of the ship for a week in case R100’s last trial failed and R101 was needed for Canada: “In the circumstances I do not think R.101 should be put out of action for the present, even at the risk of delaying the Indian flight. I propose, therefore, if you agree, to hold up work on R.101 for a week in the hope that R.100’s flight will be completed by then.”

Thomson, the same day:

“So long as R.101 is ready to go to India by the last week in September this further delay in getting her altered may pass.

“I must insist on the programme for the Indian flight being adhered to, as I have made my plans accordingly.”

Higgins, after seeing the Secretary of State on 21 July:

“I understand from our conversation this morning that you do not approve of the proposal that R.101 should be kept as a standby for the Canadian flight … I propose, therefore, to issue instructions to D.A.D. to part R.101 immediately so as to give the best chance of its being ready according to the programme date which is being worked to. Every endeavour is being, and will be, made to keep to this programme date but, as stated in my loose Minute of the 30th June … this date does not leave any margin for unforeseen circumstances.”

The minute of 30 June had said: “One trial flight will be necessary before the airship leaves for India, so the end of September is the earliest date on which the flight can commence. This leaves no margin for eventualities and assumes that the trial flight will be completely successful.”

Thomson, 22 July: “The first paragraph of your Minute states the position correctly. I note and approve course of action proposed in paragraph 2. As regards paragraph 3, I am sure everything possible will be done and am not unduly pessimistic.”

26 August 1930: the private secretary’s memorandum

Mr Reynolds, Lord Thomson’s private secretary, to the Secretary of State, after consulting Colmore on a telegram from the Government of India asking for the date of arrival at Karachi:

“1. The date of the departure of R.101 for India now depends on five separate factors:—

“(i) the completion of the work on inserting the extra bay; (ii) the completion and installation of a reversing Tornado engine to enable the airship to have five engines going ahead; (iii) the completion of a reversible airscrew suitable for the engine; (iv) suitable weather for getting the airship out of the shed when ready for flight; and (v) the carrying out of a satisfactory trial flight of not less than 24 hours between being taken out of the shed and starting on the flight to India. …

“4. There would therefore be six days available for items (iv) and (v), viz., getting the airship out of the shed and carrying out the trial flight. It is clear that this leaves no margin, but may just be possible.”

1 October 1930: the professor’s letter

Professor Bairstow to the Secretary, Air Ministry, on the “Airworthiness of R.101 with additional bay”:

“In accordance with instructions, we have examined the new information supplied to us by the Royal Airship Works, and have satisfied ourselves that R.101 as now existing with its additional bay complies with the specified requirements of the Airworthiness of Airships Panel.

“The difference between the conditions of loading of R.101 now submitted and those of the original design on which our previous report was based, surprised us by their magnitude; the differences are not primarily a consequence of the addition of the new bay.

“A good deal of general thinking and comparison on limited information has been required in reaching our conclusion and we have not had time since receiving essential information from the R.A.W., to prepare a sufficiently considered written report. We are proceeding to put our first draft into final form.

“L. Bairstow.

“P.S.—The substance of this letter was agreed with Professor Pippard last evening.”

From the draft he was writing when he heard of the disaster:

“We have not been provided with calculations relating to R.101 as completed and before the addition of the new bay but sufficient information is available to show that much of the change found is not consequential on the added bay. We have in fact found our task one of difficulty owing to the lack of tables of forces and moments comparable with those for ‘R.101 designed’ … Instead of some 200 pages of tables dealing with different states of loading we have Design Memorandum No. 35 and seven sheets of loadings and an additional note prepared at our request dealing with aerodynamic loadings in the vertical plane. We have necessarily had to change our procedure and decide the question of airworthiness on general considerations and not on specific calculations. It is our opinion that the newness of the venture would have justified complete recalculation of the stresses in R.101 when the magnitude of the changes in fixed weights had been realised. Such recalculation was at one time proposed.”

1 and 2 October 1930: the last trial

Richmond’s diary: “1st October (Wednesday). R.101 brought out of shed at approximately 6.30 a.m. Wednesday to Thursday. Trial flight. Impossible to carry out full speed test owing to the early failure of the oil cooler in the forward starboard engine. Flying conditions were very perfect, and under these conditions, all other items in the ship behaved admirably.”

Atherstone’s journal: “The trial was very successful except for a burst oil cooler in the starboard forward engine car which put that engine and the Beverly out of action for the rest of the flight. The ship appeared to be much better in the air than before and the cover was really good.”

2 October 1930: the conference and the certificate

Mr Reynolds’ note of the meeting between the Secretary of State, Colmore and Dowding: “Colmore: ‘Leave Saturday 5 or 6 o’clock.’ Thomson: ‘No rush on my account.’” And, on Dowding’s point that the ship had never done full-power trials, that she “ought to do full-power test near home.”

Certificate of Airworthiness No. L/A. 6 (Airships), C.A. Form 82. Owner: The Air Council, Whitehall. Constructor: Air Ministry (Royal Airship Works). Registration: G-FAAW. Type: R.101. Category: Special; subdivision (v) Research or experimental. Maximum gas capacity: 5,508,800 cubic feet. Overall length: 777 ft 2½ inches. Engines: Tornado Mark III, three; Tornado Mark IIIR, two; 585 h.p. at 900 revolutions per minute. Total gross lift: 169.85 tons. Weight empty: 113 tons. Compulsory conditions: minimum crew, 1 first officer, 2 second officers, 2 helmsmen, 10 engineers; minimum ballast required, four tons; “Smoking in the airship is permitted in the Smoking Room only.” Then the printed formula, with the date typed into it: “The Secretary of State for Air, having regard to the Reports furnished to him, issues the present Certificate of Airworthiness dated the 2nd October, 1930, in respect of the above-mentioned aircraft in accordance with the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, dated 13th October, 1919, Annex B, and with the Air Navigation Act, 1920, and the Orders in Council in force thereunder.” Signed for the Deputy Director of Civil Aviation.

The captain’s programme

Produced at the inquiry, drawn up by Flight Lieutenant Irwin “at a much earlier stage”, and never carried through. After flights by day and by night in good weather and a flight of twenty-four hours in reasonably adverse weather, it called for:

“a flight of 48 hours’ duration under adverse weather conditions to windward of base. Ship to be flown for at least 6 hours continuous full-speed through bumpy conditions and the rest of the flight at cruising speed. Ship to be berthed in shed as soon after landing to mast as possible, and a complete bow to stern inspection carried out.”

The report’s comment: “When it is remembered that the only trial of the R.101 after the new bay was inserted lasted for under 17 hours, and that under ‘perfect flying conditions,’ after which she started for India without ever returning to her shed for further inspection at all, it is impossible to avoid agreeing with the view of Squadron Leader Booth”, that the officers’ agreement to leave “was biased by the fact of the Imperial Conference coming off”.